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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Case No. 19082

IBRIAN ORTIZ,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a conviction of aggravated robbery, a
first degree felony, in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick presiding.

* * * * * * * * * *
EDWARD K. BRASS
Attorney for Defendant-Apppellant
321 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Phone:
(801)322-5678
DAVID WILKINSON
Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

ED
MAY 1 ;3 198 11
CIErk, Supremo Court, Utah
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

IBRIAN ORTIZ,

Case No 16566

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant appeals from a conviction of aggravated
robbery entered in the Third District Court.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty on February 15, 1983,
following a two day jury trial.

On March 4, 1983, he was

sentenced to from five years to life in prison and a consecutive sentence of at least one year but not more than five
for using a firearm to commit the offense.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
A reversal of the conviction and a new trial are sought.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 9:00 a.m. on September 20, 1982,
R1ch3rd Bullock was working at a gas station at 3900 South

and Ninth East in Salt Lake County,
Two men entered the business.

(Transcript-9-10).

One of the men pulled a gun

and ordered him to lie on the floor (T-12-13).
taken from the cash register (T-13).

Money was ther.

Bullock identified the

men with the gun as one Leonardo Rayes

(T-14) and the other

man as the appellant (T-15).
A second witness to the robbery 11as Becky Edwards,
a

woman who had just purchased some gas when it occurred

(T-47).

She too identified Rayes as one of the robbers (T-52:

She also said the appellant was the other man (T-52), but
that she had seem him only briefly (T-52), had really looked
only at one of them (T-51), and had some questions as to her
identification of the appellant (T-53).
The appellant denied being with Rayes that evening
specifically and denied ever spending time with him socially
or otherwise in general (T-138) .

He denied committing the

robbery or going to the gas station (T-142).

His defense

was that he had spent the entire evening with a Pedro Revas
and Santiago Crisbo (T-137, 139), including being questioned
by an officer that evening (T-142).
The officer who sto9ped them confirmed that the three
were together after 9:00
or 10: 30 p .m.

(T-118).

and perhaps closer to 10:00
However, the defenddnt was not perrn1:··

to put on further testimony to establish an alibi.
The defendant's alibi notice identified
-2-

Crisbo as a witness and gave the Salt Lake County Jail as
his address

(T-126-127).

It was filed one week in advance

of trial but the Court felt it "was in compliance with the
rule,"

(T-130).

Unfortunately, Crisbo, who had apparently

not been subpoenaed, was released from jail the same week
the notice was filed
learned that

(T-126).

The appellant's counsel then

Pedro Revas was also in jail and on the Thursday

preceding the Monday trial she asked the prosecutor if she
could substitute Revas for Crisbo (T-127).

The State objected

(T-129) and the Court ruled that the notice as to Revas was
inadequate

(T-131) .

Counsel for the defendant then stated

that the failure to timely file the notice of alibi may have
rendered her representation inadequate or incompetent (T-131,
132).

No corroboration of the defendant's version was presented

and he was convicted.

Present counsel was then appointed by

this court to conclude the appeal.
A R G U E M E N T
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REFUSING
TO PERMIT AN ALIBI TO BE PRESENTED.
The defense of alibi is governed by section 77-14-2,
U.C.A.

(1953, as amended), which requires a notice of alibi

to be filed no less than ten days before trial.

Subsection

(3) of the present statute provides, "If a defendant or
µrosccuting attorney fails to comply with the requirements
-3-

of this section, the court may exclude evidence offered to
establish or rebut alibi."

The use of the word "may"

leaves the decision to exclude or admit alibi evidence to
the discretion of the trial judge when the notice given is
defective.

In the present case the judge abused his discretio:

by excluding the proffered evidence.
State v. Anderson, 25 v. 2d 26, 474 P.2d 735 (1970),
is apparently the sole case in wh".i.ch the failure to give the
required notice was deemed to be sufficient reason to exclude
the alibi testimony.

The case is unique in that the defendant'

attorney made absolutely no effort, even when coaxed by the
trial court, to justify his failure.

In three other cases

involving the prosecution's failure to give the required
statutory notice, this Court has consistently found "good
cause" to waive the notice requirement where " .

the

defense is not so surprised and thus prejudiced when it has
implied prior knowledge of the State's [alibi] rebuttal
witnesses," State v. Haddenham, 585 P.2d 447, 448 (Utah 19781:
State v. Case,

547 P.2d 221 (Utah 1976); Gentry v. Smith,

600 P. 2d 1007 (Utah 1979).
In the present case, the State could not have been
"so surprised and thus prejudiced" by

testimony of Reva"

because it had "implied prior knowledge" of his existence
the content of his testimony.

The apµellant's defense was

that he spent the entire evening in question with Cr1sbo and
-4-

Revas.

The police officer's testimony established that the

three were together at 10:00 p.m.

The Court found the notice

with respect to Crisbo to be adequate.

All that the appellant

proposed when he learned that Crisbo had been released but
Revas was now incarcerated was to substitute Revas for Crisbo.
It strains credulity to believe, considering the three purportedly
spent the evening together, that Revas would somehow testify
markedly different that Crisbo and the appellant, thus "surprising"
the State.

The appellant did not attempt to change the nature

or content of his alibi, he merely proposed that the witness
he originally intended to call be substituted for by another.
The refusal to permit the substitution was an abuse of discretion.
The prejudice caused to the appellant by the refusal to
permit his witness to testify is manifest.

The jury was left

solely with the word of the defendant against two questionable
identifications. It cannot be concluded that the refusal to
permit him to present corroboration of his version was harmless
error.
POINT II
INADEQUACY OF COUNSEL
Aopellant's trial counsel questioned on the record
and in her docketing statement whether she had rendered
C'ffective assistance of counsel.

Her concern must be examined

aqainst the principles most recently reviewed in Codeinna v.
660 P. 2d 1101 (Utah 1983).
-5-

The Court set forth three requirements when such a
claim is made.

First, the defendant must prove a demonstrable

reality that counsel was inadequate.

Second, the questioned

area must not appear to be the product of a legitimate exerci"
of trial tactics.
be prejudicial.

Third, the deficiency in performance must
Id., at 1109.

In the present case, tactics are not implicated in the
failure to file a notice in the statutorily mandated time.
Counsel missed the deadline and offered her own opinion that
she was therefore inadequate.

The prejudice the defendant

suffered was in his inability to present corroboration of his
alibi.
CONCLUSION
For either of the foregoing reasons a new trial
should be granted.
Dated this

[C)

day uf May, 1984.

EDWARD K. BRASS
Attorney for Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing was mailed to Utah Attorney General, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and to Ibrian Ortiz,
Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020 this

-

I() day of May, 1984.
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